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Equilibrium in Product Markets
with Imperfect Information
By J. E. STIGLITZ*
This paper is concerned with the relation-
ship between information and market equilib-
rium: with the effect of information on the
effective degree of competition, on the level of
prices and their dispersion, on the variety and
character of products produced by markets,
on the one hand; and with the demand for
information by consumers and the supply of
information by producers, on the other. I shall
argue not oniy that taking appropriate
account of the costs of information provides
an explanation of many phenomena which
otherwise could not be explained, but that it
also casts considerable doubt on a number of
presumptions of traditional economics, for
example, the efficiency of competition, and
the policy prescriptions derived from those
presumptions.
Traditional models of competition with
perfect information obviously cannot explain
the widely observed phenomena of price
distributions, which seem sufficiently persis-
tent that they cannot simply be dismissed as a
disequilibrium phenomenon; nor can they
explain advertising; nor can they explain why
markets in which there are only a few large
firms often seem more competitive than
markets with many small firms. The work I
am about to describe, which attempts to
characterize equilibrium in product markets
in which information is costly, provides
considerable insight into these phenomena. At
the same time, examining markets with costly
information raises several important conun-
drums for competitive equilibrium theory: in
the simplest of models formulated, no market
equilibrium exists. The resolution of this
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paradox provides one of the foci of this
paper.
It is important to recognize that market
structure is itself an endogenous variable, a
result (at least in many cases) of natural
barriers to entry and incentives to agglomer-
ate, some of which are related in an essential
way to the cost of information. In this paper, I
shall not have time to explore this set of
relationships; throughout, it shall be assumed
that the only barrier to entry is the fixed cost
of establishing a new firm and that these are
sufficiently small that markets will be charac-
terized by a large number of firms.
I. Imperfect Information and Monopoly Power
A. Competitive Markets with
Monopoly Price
It has long been recognized that imperfect
information would result in firms having some
degree of monopoly power. But it was
presumed that a market equilibrium with
"small" costs of search would be "very simi-
lar" to one with zero search costs; I suspect
this belief is based on the presumption of
continuity which seems to have been
ingrained in economists at least since Alfred
Marshall's famous dictum.
As Tibor Scitovsky and Peter Diamond
have shown, this is not necessary; even with
infinitesimal search costs and a very large
number of firms, in market equilibrium the
price is the monopoly price. To see this,
assume all individuals have the same demand
curve, all firms have the same cost functions,
and also all charge the same price. Then if
price is below the monopoly price, it would
pay any firm to raise its price by an amount
less than the magnitude of search costs for the
individual with the lowest search cost, for it
would then not pay any customer to leave the
given store and go to another. But this, in
turn, implies that all firms will raise their
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prices until marginal revenue equals marginal
costs.
So far, nothing has been said about the
determination of the number of stores. If we
allow free, competitive entry, we obtain a
result of considerable importance: all the
monopoly proflts are dissipated in excess
entry: competition is socially wasteful.
Monopoly is Pareto superior to free competi-
tion.^
This is not the only presumption of conven-
tional economic theory which needs to be
reversed. In market equilibrium, if there are a
large number of firms, no single firm has any
effect on the search behavior of individuals.
But if a group of firms can get together, they
can, by lowering their price, induce individu-
als to search to find one of the members of the
"low-price chain." Thus a reduction in the
number of competing firms may result in
more effective competition and lower prices to
the consumer.
B. Nonexistence of Equilibrium:
Gresham's Law Revived?
Among businessmen, there is some belief in
the converse proposition, that excessive
competition may actually destroy markets in
which there is costly information. This can
occur even in the simplest of search models.
For instance, assume that individuals always
purchase one unit of the good (if they
purchase it), and that the dollar value of the
utility they derive from it is equal to u. Hence,
when consumers arrive at a store, they
purchase if and only if the price p is less than
u. In this context, the monopoly price is u, and
hence each firm will raise its price p to u. But
if it is costly to go to the market, then the
utility from entering the market itself is w —
p — c = —c<0, where c is the cost of
search. Thus, no consumer will enter the
market. In their ruthless attempts to exploit
the hapless consumer who has entered the
market, firms continue to raise the price to
'It is important to emphasize that these considerations
have to be balanced off against other, probably more
important, advantages of competition, which are not well
captured by the traditional analyses of competitive
markets. See the author (1978a).
the point where the marginal individual who
has entered the market is just indifferent to
purchasing or not purchasing; but if all of his
consumer's surplus is eliminated, then he will
have no incentive to enter the market at all.
But since each firm is small, it perceives itself
to have no effect on the individual's decision
to enter the market.^ Hence, if all individuals
have positive search costs (no matter how
small), there never exists a competitive
market equilibrium with uniform prices for
homogeneous commodities. This result seems
a quite general and disturbing paradox. Three
possible resolutions are addressed in Sections
II, III, and IV.
II. Elquilibrium Price Distributions
Market equilibrium may be characterized
by a price distribution. Although the exis-
tence of price distributions provides one of the
main motivations for market search (see
George Stigler), it initially apeared difficult
to formulate a consistent model in which price
dispersion persisted. To do so, as I pointed out
in my forthcoming paper, it is necessary to
explain (a) why individuals do not eventually
learn about the prices charged in any particu-
lar store; and (b) why different stores charge
different prices. There are some simple, if not
completely convincing, explanations for both
of these phenomena. A flow of ignorance can
be maintained either by entry of new firms or
new individuals. If firms differ with respect to
their cost functions, then the price they set
will differ, and the market will give rise to a
price distribution (see Salop, 1973). Alterna-
tively, if spatially separated markets are
subjected to random shocks and are imper-
fectly arbitraged, there will also be a price
distribution (see, for example. Dale Morten-
sen).
More interesting, however, are situations
where firms have identical cost functions.
Then it must be the case that the profits
result (see the author, 1977a) is general: individ-
uals may have conventional downward-sloping demand
curves which may differ from individual to individual;
search costs may differ from individual to individual, etc.
In these situations, the firm will employ non-linear price
schedules. (See the author 1977b.)
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generated at one price must be the same as
those at another price. Not only must profits
as a function of price have several peaks but
those peaks must be of exactly the same
height. This seems remarkable, until it is
recognized that the shape of the profit func-
tion is itself a function of the price distribu-
tion.
In particular, high-price stores may have
higher average costs, either because they
spend more to acquire customers or because
they have fewer sales (with U-shaped average
cost curves); the differences in costs exactly
offsetting the difference in price. Several such
models have been constructed.
A. Bargains and Ripoffs: Markets Exploit
High-Search-Cost Individuals
Salop and I (1977) have investigated a
model in which the low-price stores have
higher sales because individuals with low-
search cost seek them out. Only high-search-
cost individuals go to high-price stores. This
model with costly information establishes the
existence of market equilibrium with price
dispersion, and illustrates several further
general principles.
First, the market itself gives rise to the
imperfection of information. In a "planned"
economy, all firms would charge the same
price, and hence there would be perfect infor-
mation. Second, the widespread belief that
all that is required for markets to work well
is that there be some individuals who are
informed and who thus arbitrage the market
is not valid, at least within this context. The
informed convey only a limited positive exter-
nality on the uninformed, in the sense that
without them there would be fewer stores
charging the competitive price. However if
there are enough informed individuals, the
market may act competitively. On the other
hand, an increase in the number of unin-
formed creates a negative externality: there
will now be a larger proportion of high-price
stores, and the expected welfare of all the
uninformed is decreased.
Indeed, the market equilibrium in which
all individuals have costly information must
be characterized either by flrms charging the
monopoly price or by price dispersion. For it
pays individuals to undertake information
acquisition only if there is price dispersion,
that is, the market is not fully arbitraged: so if
there is no price dispersion, all individuals
remain uninformed, and the firms can then
exercise their monopoly power.
B. The Theory of Sales
In the model just described differences in
individuals' information costs give rise to the
price distribution. Salop and I also considered
a "Theory of Sales," in which all individuals
and all firms are identical and still, the only
equilibrium may be a price distribution
(1976). This model recognizes that firms can
increase sales both by attracting the more
informed, and by selling more to those who
arrive, for example, by inducing them, "in a
sale," to purchase for future consumption
(storage). If all stores charged the same price,
it would pay some firm to lower its price to
induce those who are planning to consume the
good next period as well to purchase for their
future needs. They lower their price just to
the point necessary to induce purchase for
storage. Equilibrium is established where the
extra sales just compensate for the lower price
on each sale.
It is important to observe that in these
cases, where firm profits from charging a high
price or a low price are the same, there is an
alternative interpretation of the equilibrium:'
each store randomizes its price between the
high price and the low price. In that case,
even if there were no entrants into the market,
or new firms, individuals would remain
imperfectly informed.''
Although it is now apparent that the exis-
tence of markets may, even in equilibrium, be
characterized by price dispersion, this does
not fully resolve the paradox of nonexistence
for two reasons. First, in the sequential search
model (where at each search individuals only
^Since the profits at the two prices are the same, the
firm is indifferent which price it charges. Equilibrium is
thus characterized by a mixed strategy. This interpreta-
tion is only persuasive if the ex post cost function is the
same as the ex ante cost function.
^For a similar model with mixed strategy equilibrium,
see Y. Shilony.
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find about the store they have visited) if all
firms are identical, then such markets can
never be characterized by price dispersion.
For clearly, if there were a price distribution,
the reservation price (the price above which
the individual does not buy) must be slightly
above the lowest price within the distribution.
It would thus pay that store to raise its price,
provided that the price were below the
monopoly price. Secondly, even if firms and
individuals differ, by the same kind of reason-
ing as employed earlier, it will always pay all
stores to raise their prices to the point where
the marginal entrant into the market (the
individual who is just indifferent to purchas-
ing or not) is indifferent to purchasing (given
that he has already entered). But then, he will
not want to enter the market. Hence, there
cannot exist a "marginal" entrant, and hence
there cannot exist a market.
III. Product Heterogeneity
A. Quality Dispersion
The second possible resolution to the
nonexistence paradox is that markets are
characterized by product heterogeneity. Of
course some product heterogeneity is really
nothing more than disguised price dispersion.
A good X which lasts twice as long as a good y
(if the interest rate is zero) is just equal to two
units of y. There is, however, one important
difference between price and quality disper-
sion: even after arriving at the store, the
individual may not know what the true price
of the commodity is. Only after purchasing
the commodity does he find out the effective
(true) price.
Obviously, this lack of knowledge provides
an incentive for firms to "cheat," to lower
their quality, thereby raising their effective
price. This is limited by two considerations:
firms can establish a reputation if the
commodity is repeatedly purchased. Then
"good" firms will have "repeat customers"
and thus larger sales. Secondly, firms can
provide guarantees, which both reduce the
risk borne by the customer (see Geoffrey
Heal) and serve as a "signal" (a self-selection
device) by the firm concerning its quality.
Even if firms are risk neutral, the use of
guarantees is limited by both moral hazard
and adverse selection problems—a 100
percent guarantee will result in the purchaser
. abusing the product (if he can), and if use
cannot be monitored, will lead to purchase by
those individuals who are "hardest" on the
commodity. Moreover, guarantees have to be
guaranteed, and the enforcement of such
contracts may be costly.
Individuals can attempt to infer something
about the product (or the seller) not only on
the basis of the guarantee provided but also
on the basis of the price charged. George
Akerlof, in his classic theory of lemons
considered a particular variant of this prob-
lem. He assumed that the average quality z of
a commodity offered on the market was an-
increasing function of the price z{p), while
demand was a function of price and average
quality. Since quality decreases with price, it
is possible that the "effective price," the price
per unit quality p/z, actually increases as the
nominal price decreases. In Akerlof's model,
the only possible equilibrium in which
demand equaled supply was where price was
zero: quality was zero, so demand was zero,
and supply was zero.
Subsequently, the author (1976), Salop
(1979), the author and Andrew Weiss, and
Charles Wilson have argued that, at least in
some contexts, this is an inappropriate equi-
librium concept. When individuals know that
quality is affected by price either because of
screening or incentive effects, they will use
price to affect the expected quality of the
commodity purchased. For instance, in the
labor market, a firm will choose the wage to
minimize expected labor costs, that is, mini-
mize the wage per effective labor unit; in the
capital market, a lender will choose the inter-
est rate to maximize the expected return
obtained from the loan; and in the product
market, with which we are concerned here,
the buyer will choose p to minimize the
"quality adjusted price."
In this case, competitive market equilib-
rium does not necessarily entail market clear-
ing. The law of supply and demand has been
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repealed. Assume that at the value of p at
which the quality adjusted price p/z is mini-
mized, there is some individual willing to
supply a good. Conventional theory has it that
he undercuts his rivals; price is thus bid down
until the market is cleared. But here, if an
individual offers the commodity for sale at a
lower price, then the buyer infers that it is
probably of a lower quality, sufficiently lower
in fact not to compensate for the lower price.
The existence of non-market-clearing equi-
libria has important implications for macro-
economic analysis (see Salop, 1979; the
author, 1978b).
B. Product Variety
In the discussion so far, all individuals
agree on the desirable characteristics of a
commodity. But in many situations, different
individuals place different relative evalua-
tions on the different goods offered in the
market, that is, there is some element of
matching individuals to commodities (or
jobs). Assume, for instance two kinds of
widgets, blue widgets and red widgets. Each
store can only sell one kind. Some individuals
prefer blue widgets, some red. Store owners
cannot discriminate between blue widget
lovers and red widget lovers. Then, market
equilibrium may be characterized by a price
dispersion, with low-price stores selling to
those who like their commodity and those who
would prefer the other color, but, given the
low price, are willing to stop searching, while
the high-price stores sell only to those who are
"properly matched." More importantly for
our purposes here, there may exist a market
equilibrium: an individual who goes to a
low-price store which sells the commodity
which he loves enjoys some consumer's
surplus: it is the possibility of capturing this
consumer's surplus which induces individuals
to bear the costs of entering the market.
Although this leads to the result that
market equilibrium will be characterized by
some product variety, there is no presumption
that the market will have the correct amount
of variety. Even with perfect information, of
course, markets will not, in general, have the
correct amount of product differentiation.
(See Michael Spence, Avinash Dixit, and the
author, 1977a.) But the existence of costly
information changes both the social and
private returns to variety. Those who sample
the new commodity and don't like it are worse
off, since they now have to search more than
they otherwise would. The potential benefi-
ciaries of the new commodity are those for
whom there is now a commodity more to their
liking, but because of costly search, only a
fraction of these individuals actually get the
new commodity.
At the same time, the existence of product
variety may have an important effect on the
returns to improved information. For im-
proved information may affect the elasticity
of demand facing any firm; if it increases the
degree of monopoly power of each firm, it
may lead to higher prices and lower welfare.
If it lowers the degree of monopoly power, not
only will there be better matching of individ-
uals and goods, but markets may be more
competitive and prices lower.
C. Kinked Demand Curves Arising from
Imperfect Information
The models formulated so far are basically
static, but one important implication of the
natural dynamic extension is that demand
curves are kinked. To see this, assume a
market in equilibrium, with the only individu-
als searching for the lowest price (or the
commodity most to their liking) being new
entrants. Then a firm which raised its price
would induce the marginal individuals pur-
chasing it to begin searching again, and it
thus loses customers; but when it lowers its
price, since individuals at other stores do not
know about its lower price, it does not gain a
corresponding number of new customers. It
should be noted that this argument for the
kinked demand curve is distinctly different
from the traditional oligopoly argument,
which postulates (not completely convincing-
ly) asymmetric responses on the part of rivals
(assumed to be few in number—here there
may be a large number of firms) to price
increases and decreases. The fact that
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demand curves (and by a similar argument,
labor supply curves) are kinked has important
implications for macro-economic equilibrium
(see Salop and the author, 1976; the author,
1978b).
IV. Advertising
The third resolution of the nonexistence
paradox is that individuals can obtain infor-
mation by means other than sequential
search.' Earlier, we described one such meth-
od, where individuals purchased a newspaper,
obtaining complete information. Some indi-
viduals hear about "good stores" by word of
mouth and this too may lead to a price
distribution (see Salop and the author, 1976).
In both cases, the existence of some low-price
stores with high sales provides an incentive for
some individuals to enter the market. But
firms can attempt to provide information to
their customers as well, through advertising.
This, however, gives rise to a new advertis-
ing paradox. Assume a set of firms advertise a
price p. Then, it always pays any firm to
advertise at a slightly lower price, for it will
obtain all the customers. This means that
advertised prices continue to be cut, until they
reach the minimum average cost. But then,
firms must be making a loss, since they are
breaking even on their sales, but paying
advertising costs.
Gerard Butters provided an ingenious reso-
lution of the advertising paradox: he showed
that there existed a continuous equilibrium
price distribution. Stores randomly send out
advertisements informing customers of their
price. The individual goes to the cheapest
store from which he receives an advertise-
ment. Thus, most of the advertisements of
high-price stores are ineffective; while all the
advertisements of the lowest-price store are
effective. The higher sales of the lower-price
store exactly compensates for the lower sales
of the higher-priced stores.
'Equivalently, it may be assumed that there is a mass
of individuals with zero search costs. This ensures that at
least some stores charge the competitive price; if there is
a distribution of individuals by search costs, a price
distribution may then be generated. See Peter von zur
Muehlen.
Although there are some markets in which
high-priced commodities have a higher expen-
diture on advertising, in other markets (dis-
count department stores), the low-priced
stores have larger advertising budgets.
There is an alternative resolution of the
"advertising paradox." Assume, as I did
earlier, that markets are characterized by
product and consumer heterogeneity. Then a
store can actually advertise and raise its price,
since individuals who like the given commod-
ity would rather buy there than attempt the
random lottery of the market. Equilibrium of
such markets will in general have price
dispersion; low-price stores may advertise a
great deal, but will make up for both the
lower price and the higher advertising costs
with the larger sales arising from the wider
market area they serve.
V. Concluding Remarks
Although space prohibits pursuing all the
implications of imperfect information for
equilibrium in product markets, I hope I have
convincingly shown that the traditional para-
digms of competitive markets, with perfect
information and markets equilibrated by the
mythical Walrasian auctioneer, are not only
not directly applicable, but may be seriously
misleading. For instance, attempts to promote
competition by increasing the number of
firms by removing barriers to entry may
actually reduce effective competition, in-
crease prices, and lead to lower efficiency.
Similarly, although clearly the traditional
presumption of caveat emptor has no basis
within welfare economics when information is
costly, the full implications of various
attempts at consumer protection need to be
examined carefully within a well-articulated
model of product market equilibrium of the
kind I have attempted to formulate here
before their desirability can be correctly
assessed.
Finally, the kinds of models I have devel-
oped here do seem to provide, at last, a
micro-economic foundation for many impor-
tant macro-economic phenomena: not only
have I shown how they can give rise to
rigidities in adjustment but I have also shown
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how there may be equilibria in which markets
do not clear.
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